Welfare finance reform: District states could face funding challenges by Deron Ferguson
Welfare Finance Reform:




he recent unveiling of President Clinton’s wel-
fare reform proposal marks the beginning of a
debate which, before it ends, may affect both the
design and financing of many welfare programs.
While the administration’s proposal would redesign
one of the key programs, Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC), debate has already spread
to how welfare is financed.
Poverty rates, which are determined in part by
where the poverty line is drawn, are one of the most
important factors included in welfare funding formu-
las. An issue recently introduced in both chambers of
Congress is whether poverty lines ought to be revised
according to a state’s relative cost-of-living. Revising
poverty lines would greatly affect measured poverty
rates and thus the distribution of federal grant money
to states for a variety of programs.
Welfare finance reform could have a substantial
fiscal impact on the budgets of some states in the
Tenth district, although the ability to cope with re-
form will vary from state to state. This article dis-
cusses some of the proposed changes in welfare
funding and the effect they may have on the states in
the Tenth District. Each state’s ability to offset poten-
tial reductions in welfare funding will depend on their
own budget resources and whether additional funds
are provided to states with limited resources and
higher administrative costs.
WELFARE EXPENDITURES IN THE U.S.
AND THE TENTH DISTRICT
“Welfare” encompasses a broad system of pro-
grams aimed at reducing poverty. The term typically
refers to the AFDC program, the largest direct-cash
assistance program for poor, single-parent families.
While the number of families receiving AFDC bene-
fits is a good indicator of the demand for a wide range
of welfare services, AFDC is just one of many aid
programs aimed at assisting  poor families. Other
welfare programs include Medicaid (health insur-
ance), energy and housing assistance, Food Stamps,
job training, and Supplemental Security Income (spe-
cial assistance for the aged, blind, or disabled who
are poor). Of all the programs that provide direct
benefits, spending is largest for Medicaid, followed
by AFDC, Food Stamps, and SSI. Other major social
welfare programs provide indirect benefits to poor
families. These include Head Start, the National
School Lunch Program (NSLP), and Chapter One of
the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act
of 1981, among many others.1 Food Stamps is the
only of the four largest direct programs that is wholly
federally funded and, therefore, is less likely to affect
state budgets under welfare reform. Thus, in describ-
ing the growth and composition of welfare spending,
this article will focus on Medicaid, AFDC, and SSI.
The growth of welfare spending
Spending on welfare programs has grown rap-
idly in district states in recent years, faster than the
national average. Medicaid, the fastest growing pro-
gram across the nation, grew over 18 percent annually
1 Chapter One money is used to provide compensatory instructional
services to needy children residing in low-income areas.  Typically “social
welfare” comprises any domestic program which promotes a society’s
overall welfare, such as education, veterans’ programs, public health,
housing, and so on.  Such programs need not be directed at economically
disadvantaged groups, but this article will focus on programs aimed at
such groups.
7in the district states from 1989 to 1993. Nationwide,
Medicaid spending grew nearly 17 percent per year
over the same five years. The fastest growth in Medi-
caid payments in the district occurred in New Mexico
and Wyoming, while the slowest growth occurred in
Kansas and Oklahoma (Chart 1).
Spending on the SSI program also increased
rapidly, growing 15 percent annually in the district
and 13 percent nationwide from 1989 to 1993. About
half of the increase was due to caseload growth, while
the other half was due to yearly adjustments for
inflation. Among district states, spending grew fast-
est in Wyoming and slowest in Oklahoma. 
Payments to AFDC recipients in the district
grew an average 7.8 percent per year from 1989 to
1993, slightly faster than in the nation (Chart 1). The
difference in growth between AFDC and Medicaid
was due mostly to rapidly rising health care costs in
Medicaid. AFDC spending growth ranges widely
across district states. Since 1989, New Mexico has
had the highest spending growth at 21.2 percent
annually, while Kansas and Nebraska experienced
the lowest at 4.8 and 3.9 percent. Despite steadily
increasing caseloads, the average benefit provided to
each family has remained stable in most states and
thus has actually declined after adjusting for infla-
tion. New Mexico was the only district state where
average benefits changed appreciably, increasing
almost 9 percent annually since 1989.2 
The composition and sources of welfare
spending
Public welfare, which includes cash and in-kind
assistance directly to needy families, figures promi-
nently in the budgets of state governments, both
nationally and in the district. The share of public
0
Chart 1
Growth in Welfare Expenditures, 1989-93
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2 The sharp caseload increase in New Mexico was due to that state’s
introduction of the AFDC-UP program, which covers two-parent families
with one unemployed parent.  The introduction of New Mexico’s AFDC-
UP program accounts for most of its caseload growth, as high unemploy-
ment among the state’s indian population bolstered participation.  New
Mexico also increased its “need standard” over this time, which had the




8welfare in state budgets in 1990, 15 percent for the
district states and 21 percent for all states, was second
only to education in total state general expenditures
(Chart 2). In 1993, Medicaid, one of the states’ fastest
growing programs, accounted for 18 percent of state
spending, after surpassing higher education as the
second-largest component of state spending in 1990.
The Medicaid share is expected to swell further. The
National Governors’ Association, for example, pro-
jects that Medicaid will absorb 25 percent of state
spending in 1995 (National Governors’ Association
and others). AFDC and SSI—the largest cash assis-
tance programs—together account for about 5 per-
cent of state general expenditures. 
Much of the money that states spend on welfare
programs comes from federal grants. The states are
responsible for administering Medicaid and AFDC,
so about 60 percent of direct welfare spending occurs
at the state level.3 But the federal government pro-
vides matching funds to states for Medicaid and
AFDC. Thus, the federal government provides about
two-thirds of the amount states spend on welfare
(Chart 3).
THE TENTH DISTRICT’S STAKE IN
WELFARE REFORM
With so many of their welfare dollars coming
from the federal government, states are watching
closely the emerging debate over how federal grants
are apportioned. States receive federal welfare fund-
ing based on grant formulas. Grant formulas are
constructed to reflect each state’s relative need by
including basic indicators like the poverty rate or per
capita income. The poverty line, it turns out, is a
critical factor in the formulas. In fact, poverty data
are currently used to allocate funds to nearly 20 grant
programs to state and local governments, accounting
for over $22 billion in federal funds in fiscal 1993.4 
3 The source of local funds is mostly from state grants because in some
jurisdictions the primary welfare programs are administered locally in-
stead of at the state level.
4 The largest of these programs are Chapter One ($6.1 billion), the
National School Lunch Program ($4.1 billion), and Head Start ($2.8
billion) (GAO 1994).
Chart 2
State General Expenditures, 1990
Note:  General expenditures include direct and intergovernmental.























9The definition of the poverty line has become
a prominent feature of the debate over welfare
finance reform.5 Legislation has been proposed in
both chambers of congress to redefine the poverty
line, a step that would redistribute a sizable portion
of the federal aid earmarked for welfare (Banerjee;
Pear). States with a high cost of living would receive
more federal dollars for welfare than states with a
lower cost of living.
Redefining poverty lines could also bring fund-
ing for the larger Medicaid and AFDC programs into
the debate. Currently, federal grants for both of these
programs are based on per capita income. But, be-
cause poverty rates more accurately measure the
relative demand for social welfare programs and
services than per capita income, legislators are con-
sidering using state poverty rates rather than per
capita income in the allocation formulas for AFDC
and Medicaid. Together these two programs distrib-
uted $91.8 billion in fiscal 1993 (GAO 1994).
Redefining the poverty line
Of all the changes being proposed in welfare
funding, redefining the poverty line carries the big-
gest impact. Currently, one set of poverty thresholds
according to family size is applied to all 50 states.
Under the proposed revisions, states with costs of
living below the national average would have their
poverty thresholds lowered. Lowering the poverty
line would result in fewer people qualifying for wel-
fare programs, thereby reducing the proportion of
federal aid to states for programs that base funding
on poverty counts. Overall, the district states would
receive fewer federal dollars because their cost of
living tends to be lower than the national average.
While states must use the definition of poverty
5 Poverty thresholds were first officially determined in the early
1960’s by the staff of the Social Security Administration. The original set
of poverty thresholds have since been carried forward each year and
adjusted for inflation.  Adding fuel to the poverty measurement debate,
recent evidence suggests that today’s official poverty lines, based on the
original methodology, may be drawn considerably lower than they should
be (Vaughan 1993).
Chart 3
Sources of Direct Public Welfare Spending, 1990













10provided by the federal government and built into
allocation formulas, they have latitude in determin-
ing the amount of benefits each family receives.
States who lose federal dollars, therefore, will either
have to make up the difference to maintain current
benefits or reduce benefits.
The current poverty rate in the district is about
even with the nation, but poverty rates across the
district vary widely. New Mexico and Oklahoma
have the highest rates, while Colorado, Kansas, and
Nebraska have the lowest (Table 1). Since 1989,
poverty rates in both the district and the nation have
tended to edge upward.6 
The actual method for calculating cost-of-liv-
ing disparities across states has yet to be determined
and is likely to be strongly debated. In the absence of
such a measure, a state’s average weekly earnings
relative to the national average can be used as one
proxy for the relative cost of living in each state.7
Roughly speaking, the district’s relative cost of liv-
ing, as indicated by a weighted average of each state’s
average weekly earnings, is between 10 and 15 per-
cent below the national average (Table 1). Among
district states, Colorado ranks the highest in earnings,
while Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming rank
among the lowest nationwide. Under the current pro-
posal in Congress, poverty lines would be lowered in
states where the cost of living is low. Because costs
of living tend to be lower in district states than the
national average, the district’s newly defined poverty
rates would fall below the national average and thus
result in fewer federal dollars.
The poverty revisions will affect only those
programs already using poverty data in fund alloca-
tion. But if poverty replaces income as a determining
factor in the allocation formulas for Medicaid and
AFDC, funding for these programs will be affected
as well. Funding will depend on each state’s differ-
ence in income and cost-of-living (earnings) ranking.
For example, a high-income state currently receives
relatively less funding due to its lower need. But if
its cost of living is high (indicated here by its earn-
ings), more federal matching money would be allo-
cated to it under poverty revisions, and even more so
6 Note that the Bureau of Census cautions against definitive compari-
sons, however, due to the high standard errors of poverty rate estimates
in inter-censal years.
7 See, for example, GAO 1993.
Table 1
Poverty and Weekly Earnings in the U.S. and Tenth District States
Poverty rates for persons Private industry average weekly earnings, 1992
(Percent)
1989 1992 Dollars per week Rank Percent of U.S.
U.S. 12.8 14.5 491 — —
Tenth District 13.2 14.4 434 — 88.3
Colorado 12.1 10.6 475 16 96.7
Kansas 10.8 11.0 422 33 85.9
Missouri 12.6 15.6 450 25 91.6
Nebraksa 12.8 10.3 381 46 77.6
New Mexico 19.5 21.0 386 45 78.6
Oklahoma 14.7 18.4 414 38 84.3
Wyoming 10.9 10.3 398 42 81.1
Sources: Department of Labor and Department of Commerce.
11with revised poverty levels replacing income in the
formulas for Medicaid and AFDC.
Equity considerations
Because lower costs of living are often associ-
ated with lower incomes, and thus lower tax bases,
the GAO suggests that relying strictly on redefined
poverty lines would be unfair. They argue that two
equity factors should also be taken into account when
modifying allocation formulas: fiscal capacity, or the
ability of state and local governments to finance the
nonfederal share of costs, and the administrative
costs the states must bear in providing services (GAO
1994). 
Fiscal capacity is important in allocating fed-
eral funds to a state because it measures the state’s
ability to finance public services given its revenue
capacity. Both the provision of public services and
the amount of taxable resources in a state are affected
by socioeconomic factors such as poverty concentra-
tions, crime rates, the flight of businesses and high-
income residents, and others. Taking these factors
into account, the GAO recently estimated the fiscal
capacity of the 50 states after adjusting for differ-
ences in the cost of living. The states were then
grouped into quartile rankings (GAO, 1993).8 
Several district states lie below the national
average in their ability to finance public services,
raising questions about how states might offset any
reduction in federal welfare funds. Nebraska and
Wyoming have the strongest fiscal capacity, followed
by Kansas in the second quartile, Colorado and Mis-
souri in the third, and New Mexico and Oklahoma in
the bottom. The lower fiscal capacity of New Mexico
and Oklahoma are at least partially influenced by
their higher poverty rates.
Because the administrative costs of providing
welfare services vary widely from state to state, the
GAO has suggested that they too be included in the
grant formulas. Administrative costs for specific pro-
grams, however, are difficult to measure and thus are
controversial. For example, it is difficult for policy-
makers to know whether high administrative costs
reflect actual costs or bureaucratic inefficiency. As a
result, administrative costs have been somewhat ne-
glected in serious discussions about revising grant
formulas (GAO 1994).
If administrative costs are included, states with
higher administrative costs would receive more grant
money. While the district’s overall administrative
costs are about even with the U.S. average, the impact
of accounting for administrative costs in the grant
formulas will vary among district states. This can be
seen by using AFDC as an indicator of administrative
costs, where states with higher costs would benefit
from their inclusion into grant formulas. Among dis-
trict states, Oklahoma pays the highest administrative
costs per AFDC family, while Missouri’s and New
Mexico’s costs are well below average (Table 2). 
A major component of the President’s welfare
reform proposal is to devote more resources to job
training and placement. Doing so would result in
higher administrative costs for states with greater
shares of the rural poor. Services like childcare, trans-
portation, and job training and placement are more
difficult and costly to provide in rural settings, thus
the current reform proposal may increase costs to a
number of district states, which have greater shares
of poor in rural areas. 
The district impact of welfare finance
revisions
How might district states be affected by revi-
sions to welfare funding formulas? Though a redefi-
nition of the poverty line will have a major impact,
whether states gain or lose funding will depend
mostly on whether fiscal capacity is a factor in the
new formulas.
Colorado should feel little if any funding strain
under poverty level revisions. The state already has
below-average  participation in AFDC, reflecting
moderate demand for welfare services overall. Be-
cause Colorado is close to the national average in
earnings, the state would see little change in the
federal grant money it receives based on revised
poverty data. In fact, Colorado’s AFDC and Medicaid
funding could rise slightly if poverty levels replace
income as a basis for funding the two programs. 
Kansas may suffer moderate losses due to wel-
fare funding reform. The state appears to have a cost
of living slightly below average along with an above-
average fiscal capacity. This combination suggests a
slight loss in matching federal grant money. The
funding losses should not be significant, however.
The state has below-average demand for services,
and demand for services is growing relatively slowly.
Because incomes in Kansas are near the national 8 See GAO 1993 for a full methodological description of the analysis.
12average, the state would lose little funding for AFDC
and Medicaid if poverty levels replace income as a
basis for allocating funds.
Missouri’s welfare programs would be affected
little by either the proposed poverty line revisions or
the Medicaid and AFDC formula revisions. The state
is close to the national average in both its current
demand for welfare services and growth in demand.
In addition, the state ranks near the middle in both
income and earnings. While Missouri has below-av-
erage fiscal capacity, its low administrative costs
would act as a counter balance if both factors are
included in the grant formulas. 
Nebraska stands to lose a significant amount of
the federal funding it receives for welfare programs.
Fortunately, the state has low demand and low growth
in demand for its welfare services. Nebraska is an
average income state with relatively low average
earnings, suggesting a moderate drop in funds both
if the poverty line is revised and if poverty is substi-
tuted for income in the Medicaid and AFDC formu-
las. The state’s federal funding may be reduced
further if fiscal capacity is factored into the allocation
of funds for welfare programs.
New Mexico will be hard-pressed to preserve its
current welfare programs unless fiscal capacity is
accounted for in federal funding revisions. Among
district states, New Mexico has both the highest
demand and the highest growth in demand for wel-
fare services. At the same time, the state ranks low in
per capita income and earnings. Under the revision,
federal matching funds for New Mexico could be cut
substantially, particularly if poverty levels replace
per capita income in grant formulas for Medicaid and
AFDC. Some of the lost funds would be replaced,
however, if fiscal capacity is factored into fund allo-
cation. Because the state’s administrative costs are
low compared to states elsewhere in the nation, it
would not benefit if administrative costs were fac-
tored into the grant formulas. 
Oklahoma stands to lose considerable federal
funds under welfare finance reform, depending on
how the grant formulas are revised. The state has the
second-highest poverty rate in the district and ranks
low in both income and earnings. Thus, it could see
a substantial loss in federal funding under both the
poverty line revision and Medicaid and AFDC for-
mula revisions. The state could benefit from revised
grant formulas, however, if fiscal capacity and ad-
ministrative costs were included in the revisions. 
Wyoming stands to lose some of its federal
funding for welfare programs. The amount it loses
will depend largely on whether fiscal capacity is
included in the formula revisions. While the state
Table 2
AFDC Administrative Costs, 1993
Federal share  State  share
(Thousands of dollars) Cost per family
U.S. 1,419,901 1,383,249 47.50
Tenth District 72,096 70,324 44.68
Colorado 12,679 11,489 47.34
Kansas 10,939 10,716 59.80
Missouri 16,667 16,666 30.90
Nebraska 5,677 5,676 56.50
New Mexico 5,112 5,023 27.00
Oklahoma 19,505 19,247 66.61
Wyoming 1,517 1,507 38.72
Source: Department of Health and Human Services.
13currently has a low demand for welfare services,
recently its demand for Medicaid and SSI have grown
rapidly. Thus, with a low ranking in earnings and an
average ranking in income, formula revisions for
Medicaid and AFDC are more important for the state
than poverty line revisions. Like Nebraska, however,
Wyoming would not benefit if fiscal capacity is in-
cluded into formula revisions, particularly if poverty
replaces income in the Medicaid formula.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Some district states may face funding chal-
lenges depending on the outcome of the debate over
financing the nation’s welfare programs. District
states with relatively lower costs of living, such as
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Wyoming,
may see their federally recognized poverty levels and
matching funds trimmed. Two of these states, how-
ever, have low fiscal capacity which, if included as a
component in grant formulas (as the GAO has
recommended), will help to replace funds lost due to
redefined poverty thresholds. Whether revised pov-
erty levels replace per capita income in the Medicaid
and AFDC formulas will be very important for New
Mexico and Wyoming, where growth in those pro-
grams has been high. The welfare-funding challenges
the district states will face depend largely on how
interstate costs of living will be measured and how
effectively other equity factors such as administrative
costs and fiscal capacity will be included in grant
formulas. In any event, it seems likely that some
district states will need to make the difficult choice
of paring back welfare benefits or find more dollars
to maintain them at current levels.
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